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1. INTRODUCTION
Before entering into more technical commentary over some of the
main topics of Van Laar’s ﬁne paper, I wish to emphasize two aspects
of the paper that I have much appreciated.
The ﬁrst is quite general: van Laar’s paper is a very eﬀective illus-
tration of how the scope of a normative dialectical theory of argumen-
tation exceeds the scope of logic in evaluating the reasonableness of
discourse moves that are not inferential in nature but are nevertheless
relevant with respect to the goal of resolving a dispute.
The second reason of appreciation is more contingent, one would
say more dependent to the social, political, and cultural kairo`s. The
kind of strategic manoeuvring addressed by Van Laar is clearly rele-
vant to current dilemmas of the public debate on culture, religion and
freedom of speech in the Netherlands, in Europe and elsewhere. A
dialectical analysis and evaluation of these dilemmas such as the one
proposed by van Laar, while well aware of the limits imposed by
its theoretical object, represents a real contribution to a better
understanding of what is at stake when individuals, communities and
institutions set limits to debate.
1.1. Pushing Dialectics to its Limits
It is common to see argumentation as concerned with the study of
inferences in natural language (and eventually as the criticism of infer-
ential errors in such reasoning), so that the scope of argumentation is
that of an informal logic – which may be conceived either descriptively
or normatively. In fact, both Toulmin (1958) and Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958), in the end, and despite their dialectical focus,
maintained that the fundamental way in which argumentation exceeds
logic has to do with the nature of the inferential links.
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On the contrary, dialectical approaches, and the Pragma-Dialectical
in particular, showed that, in order to evaluate arguments we need to
exceed logic in another sense by evaluating the reasonableness of
moves that don’t necessarily involve drawing an inference but are
nevertheless relevant to the goal of resolving a diﬀerence of opinion.
From my point of view – the point of view of a linguist interested
in the pragmatics of dialogue – it is interesting that this kind of evalu-
ation cannot be approached without resorting to pragmatic concepts
such as commitments and joint goals and more precisely commitment to
joint goals (Clark, 1996).
Let us look at the critical discussion from this angle. A normative
framework such as the critical discussion, to the extent to which it is a
participants’ normative framework, has to be described in terms of
joint commitments of the participants. These commitments, which
deﬁne the critical discussion, once activated by appropriate speech acts
– such as the act of advancing a standpoint – become a part of the
common ground of the dialogue – namely that part of the common
ground that Hamblin (1970) called the commitment store. The goals to
which participants are jointly committed deﬁne the speciﬁc form that
conversational cooperation takes in the dialogue: the dialogue game
being played (Rocci, 2005).
Interestingly, as the dialogue unfolds the commitment store is
updated by new obligations that the participants have incurred into as
a consequence of their speech acts. As a result, the deﬁnition of what
represents a cooperative contribution is changed. Speech acts that in
earlier phases of the dialogue would have been cooperative with
respect to the dialogue game no longer are, and vice versa.
Is it legitimate to see a critical discussion in these terms? Or, being
an ideal framework, the critical discussion should be viewed as a set of
external criteria that an analyst can apply to a dialogue in order to
evaluate it, but does not explain how people think of what they are
doing?
In fact, the latter view of the critical discussion is clearly excluded
by the notion of strategic manoeuvring. Strategic manoeuvring
emerges from the need of reconciling the dialectical goals and the
rhetorical goals of the participants. Dialectical and rhetorical goals
diﬀer sharply from the point of view of dialogue pragmatics: dialecti-
cal goals are joint goals the participants are mutually committed to,
rhetorical goals are private, individual goals; they may or may not
be known to other participants but are not part of the deﬁnition of
what it means to be cooperative in a certain dialogue. The notion of
strategy emerges from the perceived need of satisfying these two
kinds of goals. If the rules of critical discussion were not understood
as reﬂecting the joint goals of the participants (and drawing their
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logical consequences), the notion of strategic manoeuvring would be
incomprehensible.
The dynamic unfolding of the dialogue game is represented in Prag-
ma-Dialectics by the stages of the critical discussion, and, within each
stage, by the dialectical proﬁles.
What are dialectical proﬁles from the point of view of a pragmatic
theory of dialogue? They take the outer shape of a grammar of dia-
logue generating all the dialectically sound dialogues for a given stage
of the discussion.1 In their algorithmic form, they resemble the interac-
tion protocols used in Artiﬁcial Intelligence, to model certain speciﬁc
types of dialogue’ between artiﬁcial agents (cf. for instance the English
auction protocol detailed in Fornara and Colombetti, 2003).
In fact, beyond this grammar-like appearance this construct hs a
deeper meaning: dialectical proﬁles model the evolution of dialectical
obligations in a developing common ground – in a commitment store.
In that sense they reﬁne the rules of critical discussion by modelling
the precise form taken by dialectical obligations as speech acts are per-
formed and their commitments added to the common ground.
We can say that in his analysis of the confrontation stage van Laar
pushes the dialectical approach to its limits in two directions.
On the one hand, Van Laar’s paper pushes the approach to its ﬁner
details – using dialectical proﬁles to develop the ﬁne grained implica-
tions of dialectical commitments in their dynamic unfolding.
On the other hand, it pushes dialectic to its external limit by look-
ing at cases where reasonableness of behaviour in view of adjudicating
a diﬀerence of opinion is confronted with other considerations and
goals assumed to be shared by the participants: preserve interpersonal
relationships, defend peace, do not imperil the lives of others, do not
damage the economy, etc. Last but not least, the goal of solving the
dispute between two participants on the speciﬁc standpoint has to be
seen in the context of other dialectical goals relative to disputes with
other participants, over diﬀerent standpoints. In this respect, Van Laar
rightly stresses the external and meta- nature of the confrontational
strategic manoeuvring where the antagonist charges the protagonist of
advancing a standpoint that has harmful consequences.
1.2. Pragmatic Dilemmas of Debate
As we have seen, the choice of the particular kind of strategic
manoeuvring that Van Laar examines is not simply theoretical but it is
also motivated by its relevance to current dilemmas of public debate in
civil society in Europe.
While in the ideal model of a critical discussion the freedom rule
states that arguers cannot be barred from advancing a standpoint,
COMMENTS ON —DON’T SAY THAT!’ 513
juridical systems do impose limitations on the freedom of speech in
certain areas.
A clear example is represented by laws which make negationism a
criminal oﬀense2 or those sanctioning racist discourse or other forms
of ‘‘hate speech’’. Such laws have the eﬀect of excluding certain stand-
points from the public debate. Scholars who examined the theoretical
justiﬁcation for measures against ‘‘hate speech’’ have mostly moved
the attention from the propositional level to the pragmatic dimension:
speech is a kind of social action, which produces eﬀects at the illocu-
tionary and the perlocutionary level and hate speech inﬂicts damage
on the concerned subject (cf. Butler, 1997). One line of reasoning, in
particular, emphasizes the perlocutionary consequences of the act of
putting forward such standpoints.
However also the propositional level deserves attention. It should
be noted that in the case of negationism and similar legally excluded
standpoints, what is excluded is one attitude towards the proposition,
as the opposite attitude is considered to have been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Propositions like The so-called Holocaust never hap-
pened or Ethnic group X are of an inferior racial stock are considered
both blatantly false as propositions and dangerous in their perlocutive
eﬀects when asserted. In short, these standpoints are seen as dangerous
lies by the statal community outlawing them.
The contexts of dialogue examined by van Laar in his paper have
a clear relation with the classic case of ‘‘hate speech’’. In the main
example the attempt to block the protagonist from advancing the
standpoint takes the form of an allegation of ‘‘hate speech’’: You are
stirring up hatred against foreigners. Yet, there are a number of diﬀer-
ences with respect to the classic case examined above: (a) the cases
concern attempts to prevent protagonists to advance a certain stand-
point, rarther than standpoints excluded by law, (b) the dialogues
typically involve cultural and religious diﬀerences, (c) the propositional
content of the standpoint is not necessarily considered blatantly false
by the party trying to block the protagonist. The focus seems to be
entirely on the consequences of the act of advancing the standpoint. In
discussions concerning culture and/or religion the mention of the nega-
tive consequences of advancing the standpoint may be even combined
with the suggestion that the issue is undecidable and is better left
unsettled. In any case there is no presupposition that the matter has
been settled once for all for the alternative standpoint.
While a dialectical approach such as the one outlined by van Laar
cannot solve alone the dilemmas associated with the possible prag-
matic negative consequences of advancing a standpoint, it does oﬀer
relevant theoretical tools that allow us to go beyond purely logical
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considerations on the one hand and pure consideration of the utter-
ance’s perlocutionary eﬀects on the other.
Consistently with the pragma-dialectical framework, the soundness
conditions that van Laar posits for this kind of confrontational strate-
gic manoeuvring are designed to determine whether the manoeuvring
is consistent with the goal of resolving the very dialogue in which it
appears – concerning the same standpoint or a reformulation of it.
These conditions are very diﬃcult to meet.
Real world dialogue games often deal with more than one stand-
point at a time and can be thus considered as bundles of critical dis-
cussions partially woven together. Moreover, they also involve joint
commitments that are not dialectical in nature, such as those concern-
ing the relational aspects of dialogue (e.g. the commitment to polite-
ness). It is natural to assume that, within the bundles, the joint goals
are at least partially ranked with respect to a teleological hierarchy. A
further question that van Laar does not explore would be to consider
cases where the resolution of a discussion is sacriﬁced to preserve a
broader dialogue. It seems important, also from a practical decision
making viewpoint, to look at the features of the dialogue that is
preserved at such a cost: is it an argumentative discussion concerning
another standpoint deemed more important? Is it some form of negoti-
ation? Or just a form of polite relational dialogue?
1.3. Remarks on the Soundness Conditions for the Confrontational
Manoeuvring based on Pointing to Negative Consequences of
Advancing a Standpoint
In this last section I will deal with some punctual questions related to
details of van Laar’s contribution.
(I) As observed above, one important feature of the confrontational
manoeuvring analysed by van Laar is represented by its metapragmatic
nature. While occasioned by the confrontation stage – by the perfor-
mance of speech acts relevant in that stage – the manoeuvre is not
part of the confrontation itself. It consists of an argumentative inter-
vention that takes as its object the act of advancing a standpoint and
results in another (critical) discussion about an evaluative/incentive
standpoint about whether is good/bad to advance the original
standpoint.
Here we can draw a distinction between the soundness of the metadis-
cussion and its relevance to the original discussion – to its confrontation
stage. Of van Laar’s soundness criteria, 1–4 concern the relevance, while
criteria 5 and 6 concern the soundness of the metadiscussion.
(II) Soundness condition (3) states that the armful consequence
should pertain to the discussion at issue and not to another one.
According to van Laar, in the case of Fortuyn’s interview, the journalist’s
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manoeuvring would be irrelevant because it concerns the possible dis-
cussion between Fortuyn and the foreigners, and not the interaction
with the journalist.
Here, however, van Laar does not consider an interesting complica-
tion due to the nature of the media that constitutively address multiple
publics through the staging of discussions (in interviews, in televised
debates, etc.): the discussion between Fortuyn and the journalist is
instrumental to another virtual discussion between Fortuyn and a
public including Islamic readers. So, the move, in the end, might not
violate so clearly rule (3).
(III) Of the three cases of possibly dialectically relevant manoeu-
vring singled out by van Laar two involve broadly psychological con-
siderations: these are the case of the ‘‘insulting’’ presentation of the
standpoint, and the case of the inappropriate circumstances for
advancing the standpoint, which would make it psychologically impos-
sible to the antagonist to productively discuss the standpoint. Here it
becomes crucial to determine who is responsible of the psychological
state: actual or pretended oversensitivity can transform the manoeu-
vring in a sort of emotional argumentum ad baculum (‘‘Don’t say that:
you make me cry!’’).
When the distress is caused by the context rather than formulation
the only dialectically sound choice seems to be suspending the discus-
sion to resume it in a more favourable context. However, this case
becomes dialectically more problematic if the discussion is adjourned
sine die as sometimes seems to be the case in debates involving cultural
and religious issues: until the political climate would change, until a
truly democratic culture would develop in those countries, etc.
NOTES
1 I refer to the tree-shaped normative proﬁles, the linear descriptive proﬁles used for argu-
ment analysis and criticism are not considered here. See Krabbe (2002) for this distinction
and for a broader discussion of dialogue proﬁles.
2 Several European countries, including Germany, Lithuania, Poland and Switzerland have
passed laws which make denial of the Holocaust a criminal oﬀense punishable by prison
sentence.
REFERENCES
Butler, J.: 1997, Sovereign Performatives in the Contemporary Scene of Utterance’,
Critical Inquiry 23(2), 350–377 (Winter).
Clark, H. H.: 1996, Using Language, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Fornara, N. and M. Colombetti: 2003, Deﬁning Interaction Protocols using a Commit-
ment based Agent Communication Language, In: AAMAS’03, July 14–18, 2003,
Melbourne, Australia.
516 A. ROCCI
Hamblin, C. L.: 1970, Fallacies, Methuen, London.
Krabbe, E. C. W.: 2002, Proﬁles of Dialogue as a Dialectical Tool’, in F. H. van Eemeren
(ed.), Advances in pragma-dialectics, pp. 153–167, Sic Sat/Newport Press, Amsterdam,
Vale Press, Virginia.
Perelman, C. and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca.: 1958, La nouvelle rhe´torique. Traite´ de l’argu-
mentation, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
Rocci, A.: 2005, Connective Predicates in Monologic and Dialogic Argumentation’, in
M. Dascal, F. van Eemeren, E. Rigotti, S. Stati, and A. Rocci. (eds.), Argumentation in
dialogic interaction, cit., pp. 97–118.
Toulmin, S. E.: 1958, The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
COMMENTS ON —DON’T SAY THAT!’ 517
